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Abstract— We solve the problem of resisting the collusion
attack in the one-way hash chain based self-healing key distri-
butions introduced by Dutta et al., coupling it with the pre-
arranged life cycle based approach of Tian et al. that uses
the same self-healing mechanism introduced in Dutta et al.
Highly efficient schemes are developed compared to the existing
works with the trade-off in pre-arranged life cycles on users
by the group manager and a slight increase in the storage
overhead. For scalability of business it is often necessary to
design more innovation and flexible business strategies in certain
business models that allow contractual subscription or rental,
such as subscription of mobile connection or TV channel for a
pre-defined period. The subscribers are not allowed to revoke
before their contract periods (life cycles) are over. Our schemes
fit into such business environment. The proposed schemes are
proven to be computationally secure and resist collusion between
new joined users and revoked users together with forward
and backward secrecy. The security proof is in an appropriate
security model. Moreover, our schemes do not forbid revoked
users from rejoining in later sessions unlike the existing self-
healing key distribution schemes.
Index Terms— session key distribution, self-healing, revocation,
wireless networks, access structure, computational security, for-
ward and backward secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Efficient key distribution and key management over reliable
channel has attracted much research interest and many classic
and efficient schemes have been proposed [1], [4]. However
these schemes are more appropriate for wired networks rather
than wireless networks. Staddon et al. [15] introduced the self-
healing key distribution which addresses the problem of how to
distribute session keys over an unreliable channel. Since then,
self-healing key distribution has received much attention.
The central concept of self-healing key distribution schemes
is that users, in a large and dynamic group communication over
an unreliable network, can recover lost session keys on their
own, even if they have lost some previous key distribution
messages, without requesting additional transmissions from
the group manager. This reduces network traffic and the risk
of user exposure through traffic analysis and also decreases
the work load on the group manager. The scheme is said to
have t-revocation capability if the key distribution mechanism
cannot be broken by any coalition of up to t users. Self-
healing key distribution can find applications for many settings
in wireless network, military oriented applications, rescue
missions, scientific explorations, broadcast transmissions and
various Internet services, where session keys are used only for
short time periods.
Following the pioneering works by Staddon et al. [15], a
number of self-healing key distribution approaches are pro-
posed [15], [9], [2], [3], [7], [11], [12], [13] to achieve uncon-
ditional security in formal generalized model with improved
efficiency. Further improvements in efficiency are obtained
by relaxing the security slightly - from unconditional to
computational [8], [5], [10]. The schemes [12], [13], [17] are
based on vector space access structure instead of Shamir’s [14]
secret sharing. The hash chain based schemes [8], [5], [10] are
computationally secure and are highly efficient compared to
the existing unconditionally secure schemes. However, these
hash chain based constructions have the fatal defect of not
being collusion resistant in the sense that the collusion between
new joined users and the revoked users are able to recover all
the session keys which they are not entitled to. Among the
collusion resistance self-healing key distribution schemes [2],
[3], [12], [13], [16], [17], only [17] is hash chain based and
uses the same self-healing mechanism as introduced in [5]. We
address the problem of achieving collusion resistance for [5]
following the approach of [17], with better efficiency gains in
computation and storage. Similar to [17], we assume that a
user can not choose the session for its revoked on its own.
Rather the user is assigned a pre-arranged life cycle by the
group manager and is forcefully revoked once its life cycle
finishes. With this trade-off and a slight increase in the storage
as compared to [5], we achieve the following:
(a) Our schemes resist collusion between the new joined
users and the revoked users (unlike [5]), besides keeping
forward and backward secrecy.
(b) Our schemes allow revoked users to join in later sessions
with new identities, while this rejoining is prohibited for all the
existing hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes
including [5] (except [17]).
(c) Storage and computation overheads in our scheme are
less than in [17] as we do not use forward key chain.
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Self-healing key distribution is an ideal candidate to es-
tablish session keys in large and dynamic wireless networks
in which session keys can be used only for a short time
period due to frequent membership change. Thus assigning
each user a pre-arranged life cycle by the group manager and
not allowing the user to revoke before its life cycle completes,
has natural appeal in many applications. Several innovative
business models allow contractual subscription or rental by
the service provider for the scalability of business and do not
allow the user to revoke before his contract is terminated. Our
schemes are suitable for such applications. Moreover, rejoining
of revoked users can be done in our schemes at later session
with new identities without compromising security, unlike the
existing self-healing schemes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Key Distribution and Self-Healing
Consider the following scenario for pay-per-view TV chan-
nel. Suppose {U1, . . . , Un} is a dynamically changing group of
users (clients) and GM /∈ {U1, . . . , Un} is the group manager
(the cable operator). The problem is how the GM can securely
communicate with its dynamically changing group of clients
over an insecure broadcast channel, so that only authorized
clients (who pay) may view the content broadcast by the
GM. The GM encrypts the content using a session key. We
need a mechanism of distributing this session key in such a
way that only the authorized users can recover this session
key and decrypt the encrypted content. This mechanism is
referred to as the key distribution problem. Our goal is to
minimize the overhead for this key distribution keeping the
following few issues in mind: (a) group-rekeying is needed
on each membership change; (b) depending on specific nature
of applications, we can adopt periodic group-rekeying; (c)
efficient and secure revocation as well as joining mechanisms
are required for dynamic groups.
On top of this, Ui may be off-line for some time due to
power failure and may need to recover lost session keys im-
mediately after going on-line again. The Self-healing property
enables qualified users to recover lost session keys on their
own, without requesting additional transmission from the GM.
The following notations are used throughout the paper.
U : set of all users in the networks
Ui : i-th user
GM : group manager
n : total number of users in the network
m : total number of sessions
t : the maximum number of compromised user
Fq : a field of order q
Si : personal secret of user Ui
SKj : session key generated by the GM in session j
Bj : broadcast message by the GM during session j
Zi,j : the information learned by Ui through Bj and Si
Rj : the set of all revoked users in and before session j
H : a cryptographically secure one-way function
SB : backward key seed generated by the GM
KBi : i-th backward key in the backward key chain
B. One-Way Functions
Our constructions for self-healing key distribution are based
on the practical intractability of one-way functions. Informally
speaking, a one-way function f : A → B satisfies the
following two properties where A and B are two finite sets:
(a) f is easy to compute; and (b) f is hard to invert, i.e., it
is difficult to get x from f(x). See [6] for a formal definition
of one-way function.
C. Our Security Model
We now state the following definitions that are aimed to
computational security for session key distribution adopting
the security model of [9], [15].
Definition 2.1: (Session Key Distribution with privacy [15])
Let i, t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
1) D is a session key distribution with privacy if
(a) for any user Ui, the session key SKj is efficiently
determined from Bj and Si.
(b) for any set R ⊆ U , |R| ≤ t, and Ui /∈ R, it is
computationally infeasible for users in R to determine the
personal key Si.
(c) what users U1, . . . , Un learn from Bj cannot be deter-
mined from broadcasts or personal keys alone. i.e. if we con-
sider separately either the set of m broadcasts {B1, . . . ,Bm}
or the set of n personal keys {S1, . . . , Sn}, then it is com-
putationally infeasible to compute session key SKj (or other
useful information) from either set.
2) D has t-revocation capability if given any R ⊆ U , where
|R| ≤ t, the group manager GM can generate a broadcast Bj ,
such that for all Ui /∈ R, Ui can efficiently recover the session
key SKj , but the revoked users cannot. i.e. it is computationally
infeasible to compute SKj from Bj and {Sl}Ul∈R.
3) D is self-healing if the following is true for any j, 1 ≤
j1 < j < j2 ≤ m:
(a) For any user Ui who is a member in sessions j1 and j2,
the key SKj is efficiently determined by the set {Zi,j1 , Zi,j2}.
(b) Let 1 ≤ j1 < j < j2 ≤ m. For any disjoint
subsets L1, L2 ⊂ U where L1 is a coalition of users removed
before session j1 and L2 is a coalition of users joined from
session j2, and |L1 ∪ L2| ≤ t, the set {Zl,j}Ul∈L1,1≤j≤j1 ∪
{Zl,j}Ul∈L2,j2≤j≤m cannot determine the session key SKj ,
j1 < j < j2. i.e. SKj can not be obtained by the coalition
L1 ∪ L2.
Definition 2.2: (t-wise forward and backward secrecy [9])
Let t, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
1) A key distribution scheme D guarantees t-wise forward
secrecy if for any set R ⊆ U , where |R| ≤ t, and all Ul ∈ R
are revoked before session j, it is computationally infeasible
for the members in R together to get any information about
SKj , even with the knowledge of group keys SK1, . . . ,SKj−1
before session j.
2) A session key distribution D guarantees t-wise backward
secrecy if for any set J ⊆ U , where |J | ≤ t, and all Ul ∈ J
join after session j, it is computationally infeasible for the
members in J together to get any information about SKj ,
even with the knowledge of group keys SKj+1, . . . ,SKm after
session j.
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III. SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTIONS WITH
t-REVOCATION
In this section, we present three efficient constructions for
self-healing key distribution with t-revocation capability and
refer them as SHKD−1, SHKD−2 and SHKD−3 respectively.
SHKD−1 uses Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme
For SHKD − 2 and SHKD − 3, we adopt the same self-
healing technique and make use of a revocation polynomial for
efficient revocation instead of using secret sharing schemes.
For all the following constructions, we consider a setting
in which there is a group manager (GM) and n users U =
{U1, . . . , Un}. All operations take place in a finite field, Fq ,
where q is a large prime number (q > n). In our setting, we
allow a revoked user to rejoin the group in a later session.
Let H : Fq −→ Fq be a cryptographically secure one-way
function.
A. Key Distribution SHKD− 1
• Setup: Let t be a positive integer. The group manager GM
chooses independently and uniformly at random m polyno-
mials f1(x), . . . , fm(x) ∈ Fq[x], each of degree t. The GM
randomly picks an initial backward key seed SB ∈ Fq . It
repeatedly applies (in the pre-processing time) the one-way
function H on SB and computes the one-way backward key
chain of length m:
KBi = H(K
B
i−1) = H
i−1(SB) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
The GM also selects at random m numbers β1, . . . , βm ∈ Fq .
The j-th session key is computed as SKj = βj +KBm−j+1.
Unlike the existing self-healing key distribution schemes,
our setting allows a revoked user to rejoin the group in
a later session with a new identity. However, we make
the following restriction on the life cycle of each user as
determined by the GM. Each user Ui is first assigned a
prearranged life cycle (si, ti), where 1 ≤ si < ti ≤ m,
by the GM. i.e. Ui is involved in ki = ti − si + 1 many
sessions and is not allowed to revoke before session ti,
however Ui may get off-line during its life cycle due to power
failure. Self-healing is needed at this point. Each user Ui, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, receives its personal secret keys corresponding to
the ki sessions Si = {fsi(i), . . . , fti(i);βsi , . . . , βti} from
the group manager via the secure communication channel
between them.
• Broadcast: Let Rj be the set of all revoked users for sessions
in and before j such that |Rj | ≤ t and Gj be the set of
all non-revoked users in session j. In the j-th session the
GM first chooses a set of indices (different from 0) Wj =
{x1,j , . . . , xt,j} such that IRj ⊆Wj , but Wj∩IGj = ∅, where
IRj represents the indices of the users in Rj , IGj denotes the
set of indices of users in Gj and ∅ is the empty set. The
GM then computes Zj = KBm−j+1 + fj(0) and broadcasts the
following message Bj :
Bj = {x1,j , . . . , xt,j ; fj(x1,j), . . . , fj(xt,j);Zj}.
• Session Key Recovery and Message Recovery: When a non-
revoked user Ui receives the j-th session key distribution mes-
sage Bj , it interpolates {(xl,j , fj(xl,j)}l=1,...,t and (i, fj(i)) to
recover fj(0) by Lagrange’s interpolation formula as follows:
fj(0) =
t∑
l=0
Λlfj(xl,j),
where
Λl =
t∏
k=0
k 6=l
−xk,j
xl,j − xk,j
with x0,j = i. Then Ui recovers the key KBm−j+1 as
KBm−j+1 = Zj − fj(0).
Finally, Ui evaluates the current session key
SKj = βj +K
B
m−j+1.
A user Uk who either does not know its private information
(fj(k);βj) or who is a revoked user in Rj , i.e. Uk ∈Wj∪Rj ,
cannot compute fj(0) because Uk knows insufficient number
of points to interpolate the polynomial fj(x) from the
broadcast message Bj . Consequently, Uk cannot recover the
backward key KBm−j+1 and hence the j-th session key SKj .
• Add Group Members: When a new user wants to join
the communication group starting from session j, the
user gets in touch with the GM. The GM in turn picks
an unused identity v ∈ Fq , assigns a life cycle (sv, tv)
to the new user with sv = j, computes the personal
secret keys corresponding to kv = tv − sv + 1 sessions
Sv = {fsv(v), . . . , ftv (v);βsv , . . . , βtv} and gives Sv to this
new group member via the secure communication channel
between them.
Complexity.
− Storage overhead: Storage complexity of personal key for
user Ui with life cycle (si, ti) is 2(ti − si + 1) log q bits.
− Communication overhead: Communication bandwidth for
key management is (t + 1) log q bits. Here we ignore the
communication overhead for the broadcast of points xl,j for
l = 1, . . . , t, as these identities can be picked from a small
finite field.
− Computation overhead: The computation cost for key
management is 2(t2 + t), which is essentially the number
of multiplication operations needed to recover a t-degree
polynomial by using Lagrange’s interpolation formula.
B. Key Distribution SHKD− 2
• Setup: The group manager randomly picks an initial back-
ward key seed SB ∈ Fq . It repeatedly applies (in the pre-
processing time) the one-way functionH on SB and computes
the one-way key chain of length m:
KBi = H(K
B
i−1) = H
i−1(SB)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The GM also selects at random m
numbers β1, . . . , βm ∈ Fq . The j-th session key is
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computed as SKj = βj + KBm−j+1. The group manager
chooses independently and uniformly at random m t-degree
polynomials f1(x), . . . , fm(x) ∈ Fq[x], t < m, n. Each user
Ui is first assigned a prearranged life cycle (si, ti), where
1 ≤ si < ti ≤ m, by the GM. Each user Ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
receives its personal secret keys corresponding to the
ki = ti−si+1 sessions Si = {fsi(i), . . . , fti(i);βsi , . . . , βti}
from the group manager via the secure communication channel
between them.
• Broadcast: Let Rj = {Ul1 , . . . , Ulwj } be the set of all
revoked users for sessions in and before j such that |Rj | =
wj ≤ t. In the j-th session the group manager locates
the backward key KBm−j+1 in the backward key chain and
computes the polynomials
rj(x) = (x − l1) · · · (x − lwj ),
hj(x) = K
B
m−j+1rj(x) + fj(x).
The polynomial rj(x) is called the revocation polynomial in
session j and the polynomial fj(x) plays the role of masking
polynomial in session j. The group manager broadcasts the
following message Bj :
Bj = Rj ∪ {hj(x)}.
• Session Key Recovery: When a non-revoked user Ui receives
the j-th session key distribution message Bj , it evaluates the
polynomial rj(x) at point i and recovers
KBm−j+1 =
hj(i)− fj(i)
rj(i)
.
Note that from the broadcast message Bj , one gets Rj ,
thereby gets the indices of all revoked users, and consequently
can easily compute the revocation polynomial. Finally, Ui
evaluates the current session key
SKj = βj +K
B
m−j+1.
• Add Group Members: When a new user wants to join
the communication group starting from session j, the
user gets in touch with the GM. The GM in turn picks
an unused identity v ∈ Fq , assigns a life cycle (sv, tv)
to the new user with sv = j, computes the personal
secret keys corresponding to kv = tv − sv + 1 sessions
Sv = {fsv(v), . . . , ftv (v);βsv , . . . , βtv} and gives Sv to this
new group member via the secure communication channel
between them.
Complexity.
− Storage overhead: Storage complexity of personal key for
user Ui with life cycle (si, ti) is 2(ti − si + 1) log q bits.
− Communication overhead: Communication bandwidth for
key management is (t + 1) log q bits. Here we ignore the
communication overhead for the set of identities of revoked
users, as these identities of revoked users can be picked from
a small finite field.
− Computation overhead: The computation cost for key
management is 2(t + 1), which is the number of multipli-
cation operations needed to find two points on two t-degree
polynomials.
C. Key Distribution SHKD− 3
• Setup: The group manager randomly picks the backward key
seed SB . It repeatedly applies (in the pre-processing time) the
one-way hash functionH on the initial backward key seed SB
and computes the one-way key chain of length m:
KBi = H(K
B
i−1) = H
i−1(SB)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The GM also selects at random m
numbers β1, . . . , βm ∈ Fq . The j-th session key is computed
as SKj = βj + K
B
m−j+1. The group manager chooses
independently and uniformly at random a polynomial
f(x, y) = a0,0 + a1,0x + a0,1y + · · · + at,txtyt from
Fq[x, y], where t is a positive integer, t < m, n. Each
user Ui is first assigned a prearranged life cycle (si, ti),
where 1 ≤ si < ti ≤ m, by the GM. Each user Ui, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, receives its personal secret keys corresponding to
the ki = ti− si +1 sessions Si = {f(i, y);βsi, . . . , βti} from
the group manager via the secure communication channel
between them.
• Broadcast: Let Rj = {Ul1, . . . , Ulwj } be the set of all
revoked users for sessions in and before j such that |Rj | =
wj ≤ t. In the j-th session the group manager locates the
forward key KFj in the forward key chain and the backward
key KBm−j+1 in the backward key chain and computes the
polynomials
rj(x) = (x− l1) · · · (x− lwj ),
hj(x) = K
B
m−j+1rj(x) + f(x, βj).
The polynomial rj(x) is called the revocation polynomial in
session j and the polynomial f(x, βj) plays the role of mask-
ing polynomial in session j. The group manager broadcasts
the following message Bj :
Bj = Rj ∪ {hj(x)}.
• Session Key Recovery: When a non-revoked user Ui receives
the j-th session key distribution message Bj , it evaluates the
polynomial rj(x) at point i, and recovers
KBm−j+1 =
hj(i)− f(i, βj)
rj(i)
.
Finally, Ui computes the current session key
SKj = βj +K
B
m−j+1.
Note that rj(x) is computable from the broadcast message Bj
which carries the information of revoked uses’ IDs and βj is
transmitted to the non-revoked user Ui during the Setup phase.
• Add Group Members: When a new user wants to join
the communication group starting from session j, the user
gets in touch with the GM. The GM in turn picks an
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unused identity v ∈ Fq , assigns a life cycle (sv, tv) to the
new user with sv = j, computes the personal secret keys
Sv = {f(v, y);βsv , . . . , βtv} and gives Sv to this new group
member via the secure communication channel between them.
Complexity.
− Storage overhead: Storage complexity of personal key for
user Ui with life cycle (si, ti) is (ti − si + t+ 2) log q bits.
− Communication overhead: Communication bandwidth for
key management is (t + 1) log q bits. Here we ignore the
communication overhead for the set of identities of revoked
users, as these identities of revoked users can be picked from
a small finite field.
−Computation overhead: The computation cost for key man-
agement is 2(t + 1), which is the number of multiplication
operations needed to find two points on two t-degree polyno-
mials.
D. Self-Healing
We now explain our self-healing mechanism for the con-
struction SHKD − 1. The self healing for the constructions
SHKD − 2 and SHKD − 3 can be performed in a similar
way. Let Ui be a group member that receives session key
distribution messages Bj1 and Bj2 in sessions j1 and j2
respectively, where 1 ≤ j1 ≤ j2, but not the session key
distribution message Bj for session j, where j1 < j < j2. User
Ui can still recover all the lost session keys Kj for j1 < j < j2
as desired by Definition 2.1 3(a) using the following steps.
(a) Ui recovers from the broadcast message Bj2 in session
j2, the backward key KBm−j2+1 and repeatedly apply the one-
way function H on this and computes the backward keys
KBm−j+1 for all j, j1 ≤ j < j2.
(b) Ui then recovers all the session keys SKj = βj +
KBm−j+1, for j1 ≤ j ≤ j2.
Note that a user Ui revoked in session j cannot compute the
backward keys KBm−j1+1 for j1 > j. Moreover, since a user
is not allowed to revoke before the end of its life cycle, Ui
revoked in j-th session means its life cycle completes at the
j-th session. Consequently, Ui does not have βj1 for j1. As
a result, revoked users cannot compute the subsequent session
keys SKj1 for j1 > j, as desired. This is forward secrecy.
Similarly, a user Ui joined in session j does not have βj2 for
j2 < j, although it can compute the backward keys KBm−j2+1
for j2 < j. This forbids Ui to compute the previous session
keys as desired. This is backward secrecy.
Now we will show that our construction can resist collusion
required by Definition 2.1 3(b). Let 1 ≤ j1 < j < j2 ≤ m.
For any disjoint subsets L1, L2 ⊂ U , where |L1 ∪ L2| ≤ t,
no information about the session key SKj , j1 < j < j2 can
be obtained by the coalition L1 ∪ L2, where the set L1 is a
coalition of users removed before session j1 and the set L2 is
a coalition of users joined from session j2. Our constructions
satisfy this property as illustrated below for the scheme
SHKD − 1. The similar arguments hold for the other two
constructions. Secret information held by users in L1∪L2 and
broadcasts in all the sessions do not get any information about
SKj for j1 ≤ j < j2. This is true because in the worst case, the
coalition knows Si = {f1(i), . . . , fj1−1(i);β1, . . . , βj1−1} for
Ui ∈ L1, Si = {fj2(i), . . . , fm(i);βj2 , . . . , βm} for Ui ∈ L2,
and B1, . . . ,Bm. For each session j, j1 ≤ j < j2, the coalition
can get backward key KBm−j+1 from L2. However the session
key SKj is computed from the backward key KBm−j+1 and a
random number βj . The coalition L1 ∪ L2 cannot obtain the
random numbers βj for j1 ≤ j < j2. Consequently, all the
guess for SKj with j1 ≤ j < j2 are equi-probable.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The following theorems state that our constructions
realize self-healing key distribution schemes with revocation
capability. The proofs follow the argument in [5]. We omit
the proofs here due to space constraints. They are available
in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 4.1: Construction SHKD − 1 is secure, self-
healing session key distribution scheme with privacy,
t-revocation capability with respect to Definition 2.1 in our
security model as described in Section D and achieves t-wise
forward and backward secrecy with respect to Definition 2.2
in the model.
Theorem 4.2: Construction SHKD − 2 is secure, self-
healing session key distribution scheme with privacy,
t-revocation capability with respect to Definition 2.1 in the
model and achieve t-wise forward and backward secrecy with
respect to Definition 2.2 in the model.
Theorem 4.3: Construction SHKD−3 is secure, self-healing
session key distribution scheme with privacy, t-revocation
capability with respect to Definition 2.1 in the model and
achieves t-wise forward and backward secrecy with respect
to Definition 2.2 in the model.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Comparison of storage overhead, communication complex-
ity and computation cost of each user (not the GM) in
our constructions SHKD − 1, SHKD − 2, SHKD − 3 with
the existing self-healing session key distribution schemes is
provided in Table I. In one hand our constructions reduce
the communication complexity (bandwidth) to O(t), whereas
optimal communication complexity achieved by the previous
schemes is O(tj) at the j-th session. On the other hand,
we achieve less computation cost. For a user Ui at the j-
th session, the computation cost is incurred by recovering
all previous session keys upto the j-th session (worst case)
by self-healing mechanism. The communication complexity
and computation cost in our constructions do not increase as
the number of session grows. These are the most prominent
improvement of our schemes over the previous self-healing
key distributions [2], [7], [9], [15].
Our constructions are based on [5] with the following
subtle difference:
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TABLE I
COMPARISON AMONG DIFFERENT SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES IN j-TH SESSION, ki = ti − si + 1, WHERE (si, ti) IS THE LIFE CYCLE
ASSIGNED TO USER Ui BY THE GM
Schemes Storage Overhead Communication Overhead Computation Overhead
Construction 3 of [15] (m − j + 1)2 log q (mt2 + 2mt + m + t) log q 2mt2 + 3mt− t
Scheme 3 of [9] 2(m − j + 1) log q [(m + j + 1)t + (m + 1)] log q mt + t + 2tj + j
Scheme 2 of [2] (m− j + 1) log q (2tj + j) log q 2j(t2 + t)
Construction 1 of [7] (m− j + 1) log q (tj + j − t − 1) log q 2tj + j
Construction 1 of [5] (m− j + 1) log q (t + 1) log q 2t + 1
Construction 2 of [5] (m− j + 1) log q (t + 1) log q 2(t2 + t)
SHKD− 1 2ki log q (t + 1) log q 2(t
2 + t)
SHKD− 2 2ki log q (t + 1) log q 2t + 1
SHKD− 3 (ki + t + 1) log q (t + 1) log q 2t + 1
(a) No forward key chain is used.
(b) Each user Ui is pre-assigned a life cycle (si, ti) by the
GM following the work by [17]. This means user Ui can
participate in ki = ti − si + 1 sessions and can not revoke
before session ti is over.
(c) In contrast to [5], we have been able to resist collusion
attack in our constructions by using pre-selected random
numbers β1, . . . , βm (fixed) as part of users’ secret keys apart
from values on polynomials. A user Ui with life cycle (si, ti)
is given only ki = ti− si +1 values fsi(i), . . . , fti(i) and the
additional values βsi , . . . , βti as part of its secret key by the
GM via a secure communication channel between them at the
initial setup. As compared to [5], we get increased storage for
SHKD−1 and SHKD−2 if ki > m−j+12 , and for SHKD−3 if
ki > m−j+1−(t+1). The communication and computation
costs for all our schemes are the same as in [5].
(d) Revoked users may join at later sessions with new
identities without violating any security.
We adapt the similar approach as [17] to achieve resistance
to collusion attacks and the ability of revoked users to rejoin
the group. However, in contrast to [17], we done away with
forward hash key chains. Consequently, our schemes are more
efficient than [17] in terms of both storage and computation
cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced three efficient self-healing key distribution
schemes with t-revocation capability. Our proposed key distri-
bution mechanism reduces storage, communication and com-
putation costs over the previous approaches, and is scalable
to very large groups in highly mobile, volatile and hostile
wireless network. Our schemes are properly analyzed in an
appropriate security model and are proven to be computation-
ally secure and achieve both forward and backward secrecy.
Also our schemes can resist collusion between the new joined
user and the revoked users, with a trade-off in the storage
overhead and assigning pre-determined life cycle to each user
by the group manager. These trade-offs are often allowed in
certain business models such as rental or subscription. Our
setup therefore allows each user to choose its joining session at
its will, but the session for its revocation is pre-selected by the
group manager. However, unlike the existing self-healing key
distribution schemes, rejoining of revoked users is permitted
in our schemes at a later session with new identities.
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